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O33Increasing levels of income inequality have recently attractedmuch attention. The literature has concentrated on
the hypothesis that increasing levels of income inequality are the cause of slow growth and social unbalances.
This paper contributes to exploring an alternative hypothesis according to which increasing levels of income in-
equality are the consequence, rather than the cause, of slow growth andmore specifically of the slowing pace of
technological change. The paper articulates the Schumpeterian hypothesis that the rate of technological change
exerts a significant influence in reducing income distribution. Due to the powerful effects of creative destruction,
the rate of technological change engenders a reduction in wealth and rent inequalities that are highly skewed
and, consequently, limits income inequality. We test this hypothesis in an empirical exercise by implementing
quantile regressions on a large dataset of advanced and industrializing economies. The inequality diminishing ef-
fect of technological change holds along the entire income inequality distribution, but exhibits larger effects in
countries where the concentration of wealth and, consequently, income asymmetries are stronger. These results
have novel welfare implications and suggest some crucial insights for economic policy analysis.
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The literature on the causes and consequences of income inequality
has been growing steadily (see the recent contributions by Aghion et al.
(1999) and Piketty (2014)). A great deal of empirical evidence reveals
episodes of increasing income inequality both in advanced and industri-
alizing countries since the end of the 20th century (Aghion et al., 1999;
Kaplan and Rauh, 2010). One of its valuable achievements is the identi-
fication of specific dimensions of income inequality. It is now common
to distinguish between functional inequality (i.e. the division of income
between capital rents and labour remuneration in an economy) and
personal inequality (i.e. the income differences across households, re-
gardless of the nature of their assets/holdings). The concept of personal
inequality can be further refined into income inequality–where income
refers both to wage income and to other income sources such as rents –
and wage inequality (cf. the typology elaborated by Aghion et al., 1999;
Piketty and Saez, 2003).1, Germany.
ehringer).
instead of income inequality, the
holds. At the same time, they ac-
t and researchers (including the
edistribution.Nevertheless, both
ariation (Aghion et al., 1999).More recently, contributions by Thomas Piketty and Anthony
Atkinsonhave drawn attention to the role of income inequality as a deter-
minant in the reduction in the pace of economic growth (Atkinson and
Piketty, 2007 and 2009; Piketty, 2014). An inclusive review of the litera-
ture by Franzini and Pianta (2016) effectively summarizes the basic argu-
ment according to which the raising levels of income inequality have
direct negative consequences that include both: i) the negative economic
effects stemming from a decline in marginal propensity to consumption
and the accumulation of financial capital (Atkinson, 2015), and ii) rele-
vant socioeconomic aspects in terms of inequality of opportunities
(Ramos and Van de Gaer, 2015) and reduction in happiness (Ferrer-i-
Carbonell and Ramos, 2014). An increasing awareness of such negative
consequences, both economic and societal, draws attention to the identi-
fication of determinants of income inequality as the necessary condition
for defining appropriate economic policy aimed at limiting its impact.
We contribute to this literature by exploring the determinants of in-
come inequality rather than its effects: income inequality is the conse-
quence of slow growth, rather than its cause. More specifically, we
draw attention to the role of technological change in assessing the levels
of income inequality and we put forward and test the hypothesis that
the increasing levels of income inequality are determined by the de-
creasing pace of technological change.
Whereas some important work has been done on the effects of the
direction of technological change (see, for instance, Acemoglu (2003),
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bour or capital saving, quite surprisingly, little attention has been paid
to appreciating the role of technological change in general, namely, in
influencing income distribution between capital and labour via its pow-
erful effects on rent inequalities. Much work in the field has focused on
the distribution of income within countries. The comparative approach
based on the analysis of the changes in incomedistribution across coun-
tries has received less attention.However, this approach seems to be the
most promising for studying the effects of technological change in coun-
tries with different levels of income asymmetry.
We fill this gap both on the theoretical and empirical side. A compre-
hensive reappraisal of the Schumpeterian legacy shows that technolog-
ical change affects income inequality, not only via a reduction in wage
inequalities, but also in rent inequality, a key component of income in-
equality. More precisely, we analyse in depth the mechanisms through
which the rate of introduction of innovations is expected to reduce
wealth inequality via the creative destruction of large portions of the
existing capital stock, and its effects in terms of rent inequality via a re-
duction in both extra profits and interest rates. To this end, we assume a
comparative approach that includes a variety of countries. The stylized
fact of the global decline of labour share (Karabarbounis and Neiman,
2014) makes our focus on rent inequality all the more relevant.
To test our hypothesis, we use the quantile regression framework to
verify whether the established relationship between technological
change and income inequality holds for different quantiles of cross-
country inequality distribution. The implications of our arguments
lead us to expect that a reduction in mean inequality – due to the
rates of introduction of innovations – takes place across all countries,
but is driven by countries with relatively more asymmetric income
distribution.
The choice of the quantile regression methodology justifies the se-
lection of a wide sample of countries characterized by a controlled var-
iance such that all the key parameters such as revenue levels, income
concentration and rates of technological change exhibit acceptable le-
vers. The set of countries selected using this methodology includes a re-
liable group of industrializing countries comprising Turkey, Brazil,
Russia, India, and China, as well as the industrializing countries of East-
ern Europe, alongside the traditional set of advanced countries (the ad-
vanced European countries, in addition to USA, Canada, Japan, Norway,
Switzerland and Iceland). It excludes countries that do not seem able to
command technological change. As a consequence, developing coun-
tries with high levels of income asymmetries are not taken into account.
Although quantile regressions have been sometimes used on a mi-
croeconomic level (e.g. Martins and Pereira (2004) and Fournier and
Koske (2012)), this methodology has not been applied before to study
income inequality at the macro-level.2 Our results clearly confirm that
– conditioning or not on countryfixed effects – the introduction of inno-
vation is a powerful factor in reducing income inequality.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the
literature on the relations between economic growth and incomedistri-
bution and Section 3 articulates themain hypothesis. Section 4 presents
the data set and methodology and discusses the results of econometric
investigations and the final section summarizes the paper and elabo-
rates policy implications.
2. Economic growth and income inequality
The path breaking contribution of Simon Kuznets (1955, 1963) re-
mains the basic reference in the economics of income distribution for2 Martins and Pereira (2004) use survey data for male workers and apply quantile re-
gressions to analyse the relation between schooling and wage inequality in 16 countries
in the mid-1990s. Fournier and Koske (2012) use conditional and unconditional quantile
regressions to study determinants of labour earnings inequality based on household
surveys.many reasons. Kuznets elaborated an interpretative framework in
which the dynamics of income allocation reflect the changing distribu-
tion of wealth and skills and their changing prices with respect to stan-
dard labour. Kuznets, indeed, paid much attention to the changing
structure of the economic systems at the time of industrialization,
with a rapid shift away from an agricultural and rural economy towards
an urban and industrial one.
In such a historical background, he identified an inverted-U relation-
ship between economic development and income inequality. He noted
that, in the early phases of industrialization, income inequality increases
because of large differences in factor productivity between rural and
urban activities. Radical structural changes increase income asymmetry
since they engender a discontinuity in the social and economic organi-
zation. Income inequality, however, eventually declines with comple-
tion of the industrial transformation. Once the full system completes
the industrial transformation, the standard dynamics of economic
growth favour a reduction in income inequality along the following
chain of factors: 1) savings increase the supply of capital 2) they de-
crease the levels of interest rates; 3) capital intensity increases and4) la-
bour productivity increases (with the appropriate supply of
complementary skilled workforce), 5) leading to higher wages that
make a larger supply of savings possible. Moreover, in an advanced in-
dustrial economy, tighter competition in product and factor markets
makes it possible to minimize monopolistic profits. Following his
chain of factors, it appears clear that the standard mechanism of eco-
nomic growth reduces inequality (both income and wage) by means
of a decrease in interest rates, a reduction inmonopoly profits and an in-
crease in wages. Hence, the famous inverted U-shaped relationship be-
tween inequality and revenue per capita, initially suggested by Kuznets
(1963), acquires a fresh understanding. Quite surprisingly, however,
Kuznets does not include technological change as a key aspect of eco-
nomic growth and consequently a powerful factor in the reduction of
income asymmetry.
The empirical literature provides contrasting evidence on the issue.
The inverted U-shaped relationship between the stage of development
and inequality finds only partial support and seems to be quite sensitive
to the composition of the datasets and the time periods analysed
(Adelman and Robinson, 1989; Atkinson and Piketty, 2007 and 2009).
Dollar and Kraay (2002) conclude their inclusive study, extended to
all countries of the Penn World Tables, that there is no systematic evi-
dence confirming economic effects of growth on income distribution.
There is, on the other hand, converging evidence on the positive effects
of economic growth on a reduction in income inequality, especially in
developing countries (Adams, 2002 and 2004; Adams and Page, 2003;
Chen and Ravallion, 2001; Ravallion, 1995). The evidence regarding ad-
vanced countries is on the contrary mixed, especially when the last de-
cade of the 20th century is considered (Atkinson and Piketty, 2009). As a
matter of fact, Kaplan and Rauh (2010) show that income inequality has
increased at a time of fast economic growth in the recent past. The evi-
dence gathered by Gordon (2000 and 2012), however,may suggest that
slow rates of innovation that have characterized the more recent years
after the phase of a great burst of inventions in the 1970s are at the or-
igin of the new increase in income asymmetry experienced in the last
decades. A reduction in the rate of technological change would be the
cause of an increase in income asymmetries (see Table 1 in the next
section).
The later theoretical literature on the topic has shared the basic intu-
itions that support Kuznets' analysis. By articulating and expanding his
basic hypothesis, theoretical models show consensus on the fact that
in the long run, economic growth reduces income inequality. This result
is much dependent on the working of equilibrium conditions. Accord-
ingly, the closer the working of product and factor markets - including
labour and financial markets - towards perfectly competitive equilibri-
um, the lower is income inequality (Hertel and Zhai, 2006). When eco-
nomic growth is associated with market imperfections, income
asymmetry will actually increase.
Table 1
Unit cost of knowledge and total factor productivity (TFP) growth in OECD countries, 1985–2010.
Country Unit cost of knowledge TFP growth
1985–2010 1985–1998 1999–2010 1985–2010 1985–1998 1999–2010
Australia 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.5
Austria 1.8 1.1 2.6 1.4 1.3 1.4
Belgium 6.2 3.4 9.0 0.8 1.2 0.3
Canada 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.5
Denmark 1.7 1.1 2.5 0.8 1.1 0.3
Finland 1.5 0.6 2.6 1.8 2.2 1.2
France 2.1 1.9 2.4 1.0 1.4 0.6
Germany 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.2 0.7
Ireland 1.3 0.5 2.1 2.7 3.5 1.8
Italy 1.8 1.6 2.0 0.4 1.0 −0.3
Japan 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.4 1.8 0.9
Korea 0.2 0.3 0.2 3.8 4.3 3.3
Netherlands 3.4 2.9 3.9 1.0 0.9 1.1
New Zealand 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.4
Portugal 5.5 2.6 8.8 1.3 2.5 0.6
Spain 2.8 1.9 3.9 0.5 1.0 −0.1
Sweden 2.5 1.3 3.4 0.9 0.7 1.2
Switzerland 2.3 1.4 3.4 0.0 −0.6 0.4
UK 1.1 0.9 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.7
US 1.1 1.3 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.4
Average OECD 1.9 1.3 2.6 1.1 1.4 0.8
Note: Unit cost of knowledge is calculated as a share of R&D expenditure inmillions of constant (2005) PPP dollars over the number of patent applications at theWorld Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO). TFP growth is the growth rate of multi-factor productivity in per cent.
Source: Antonelli and Gehringer (2016).
87C. Antonelli, A. Gehringer / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 115 (2017) 85–98These results stem directly from an appreciation of the factors that
account for economic growth in the standard framework. According to
traditional growth theory, in fact, economic growth is engendered by
the increasing stock of capital which takes place via the accumulation
of savings. All imperfections in financial markets have strong negative
effects on the correct allocation of resources, provoking inefficiency
that favours income distribution among the wealthy (Aghion and
Bolton, 1992). Measures that remove frictions from the financial mar-
kets and, hence, improve the availability and efficiency of capital for
given levels of savings, are likely to favour a reduction in interest
rates, and finally, an increase in capital intensity. The consequences for
a reduction in wealth are straightforward: a reduction in interest rates
shrinks the effects of the possible - actually frequent - asymmetries in
the distribution of wealth that are, in relative terms, further reduced
by an increase in wage levels (Beck et al., 2007).
Within the same interpretative framework, it is clear that an in-
crease in competition both in domestic and international product mar-
kets is likely to affect the rates of economic growth positively with a
possible reduction in income inequality. This works through a more ef-
ficient allocation of resources, an improved division of labour, as well as
specialization, a growth in revenues, an increased abundance of capital,
a reduction in capital rental costs, a reduction in the effects of wealth on
income and, finally, an increase in wages (Aghion and Bolton, 1992 and
1997).
The exposure to international competition is especially effective in
reducing and sometimes overcoming the barriers to entry andmobility.
Such barriers limit competition in the domestic markets, and conse-
quently, overall growth dynamics. Greater foreign competition, visible
through the increase in imports, makes markups decline and, thus,
also profitmargins fall (Chen et al., 2009). Large empirical evidence con-
firms a positive relationship between the share of imports to GDP and
competition (e.g. MacDonald, 1996). However, the relationship has
been found effective for exports too. More precisely, the larger the
shares of exports to GDP, the higher the levels of international competi-
tion and the closer the conditions of productmarkets to the standards of
workable - if not perfect - competition. It is consequently clear that the
larger levels of openness to trade - as measured in terms of the share of
imports and exports to GDP - are, the closer the levels of prices to min-
imum average costs and the lower the levels of mark-ups and quasi
rents. Low levels of mark-ups and quasi-rents ensure that thedistribution of income is close to competitive levels, with capital and la-
bour remunerated at their marginal productivities. Firms, and conse-
quently firm owners, cannot accumulate profits. In financial markets,
interest rates are less inflated by profitmargins. It becomes evident - fol-
lowing this chain of argument - that the larger the levels of openness to
international trade are, then the lower income inequality is (Roine et al.,
2009).
Careful analysis of international economics, however, provides an
opposite argument aswell. Openness to trademay have a positive effect
on income inequality basically via increasing skill premia. This argu-
ment follows on from the observation that tasks performed by skilled
workers naturally generate economies of scale, given that they are asso-
ciated with costly R&D activities. Since falling barriers to trade ensure
access to a largermarket, this opens opportunities to benefit from econ-
omies of scale in skill-intensive activities. As (skilled) labour productiv-
ity increases,firms increase the demand for skilled labour (Manasse and
Turrini, 2001; Epifani and Gancia, 2008).
The empirical evidence on the impact of openness to trade on in-
come inequality is ambiguous. White and Anderson (2001), Dollar and
Kraay (2002), Higgins and Williamson (1999) and Edwards (1997)
find no support for the hypothesis that trade openness is associated
with higher income inequality. The last three works, in addition to
Calderón and Chong (2001), also test a more specific hypothesis for
the developed countries, but again find no evidence to support it.
Others, on the other hand, confirm that the effects may be negative
(i.e. inequality increasing) when trade takes place horizontally among
advanced countries (Lundberg and Squire, 2003; Barro, 2000). The evi-
dence regarding the effects of horizontal international trade confirms
the basic intuition that extra profits and quasi-rents play a central role
in increasing income inequality. The possible explanation for this is
analogous to the skill-premia driven effect: horizontal trade flows free
up capacities and allow economies of scale to be taken advantage of.
As a consequence, increasing market shares lead to an increase in mar-
ket power and, finally, higher extra profits in the hands of just a few. The
closer the conditions of product and factormarkets to competitive equi-
librium, the lower the chances that the accumulation of profitsmay help
increase income inequality.
TheKuznets hypothesis finds new supportwhen integratedwith the
Schumpeterian legacy. According to Schumpeter, technological change
is the ultimate cause of economic growth. Hence, the faster the rate of
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lower the levels of income inequality should be. The Schumpeterian hy-
pothesis applies to the right side of the Kuznets' inverted U, meaning
that it particularly concerns countries and historic times beyond the
radical transformation.
3. The hypothesis: rent inequalities in the Schumpeterian legacy
The growth literature so far has shown that the rate of technological
change is a key determinant of economic growth. Economic growth
does not take place only via the traditional mechanisms that relate sav-
ings to capital intensity, labour productivity and wages, but also, and
above all, via an increase in the general efficiency of economic activities
stemming from the introduction of new technologies. From this view-
point, through the fast rate that innovations are introduced, technolog-
ical changemagnifies and empowers the negative relationship between
economic growth and income inequalities identified by Kuznets. The
grafting of the Schumpeterian legacy to this debate yields important
results.
So far, the reappraisal of the Schumpeterian legacy has stressed a re-
duction in income inequalities stemming from the introduction of la-
bour intensive technologies, paying more attention to the direction
rather than the rate of technological change (Aghion et al., 2014). This
literature has paid much attention to the effects of skill-biased
asymmetries caused by technological change on income in terms of
wage inequalities as if wages were the main component of income
(Helpman, 1997; Aghion and Howitt, 1997). Along these lines,
Grossman (2001) provides a comprehensive review of the literature
by reporting the income inequality enhancing effects of the skill-
biased direction of technological change (Acemoglu, 2002 and 2003;
Okazawa, 2013) and stressing the effects on wage inequalities, but pay-
ing little attention to analysing the effects of technological change on
rents. Specifically, in the context of the skill-bias hypothesis, it has
been suggested that the new factor intensity of technological change
could be responsible for the increase in wage inequalities observed in
the new century. According to this literature, the introduction of new
technologies, strongly biased in favour of skilled labour, may have af-
fected labour markets with a sharp increase in the skill premium and
a reduction in real wages for low-skilled workers with a major increase
in wage asymmetries and hence income asymmetries (Acemoglu, 2002
and 2003; Burstein and Vogel, 2010; Costinot and Vogel, 2010;
Vanhoudt, 2000).3
This literature has not yet fully taken into consideration the impor-
tant implications of the Schumpeterian legacywith regard to income in-
equality that are engendered by the effects of the rate – rather than the
direction – of technological change on bothwealth and rent inequalities
(Aghion et al., 2015a). Schumpeter contributes to the Kuznets' hypoth-
esis by confirming that growth, as determined by technological change,
exerts a positive effect on the reduction in income asymmetry. Accord-
ing to Schumpeter, in fact, the introduction of technological innovations
is an intrinsic characteristic of the working of economic systems and
cannot be separated from economic growth: technological change and
economic growth are intertwined. This interdependence has been fur-
ther clarified by recent advances of the economics of innovation that
have brought attention to the contribution of Schumpeter (1934) on
the role of entrepreneurship in the introduction of radical innovations
(Acs et al., 2013; Aparicio et al., 2016a, 2016b), rather in contrast to
the Schumpeterian focus (Schumpeter, 1942) on the innovative poten-
tial of large corporations. The importance of entrepreneurship consists3 There are other reasons for an increase in the skill premium. Trade is one of the most
widely discussed factors (e.g. Deardoff (2000), Panagariya (2000) and Epifani and Gancia
(2008)). Offshoring activities have also been found to explain the rise in the skill premium
with the pioneering contributions by Feenstra andHanson (1997, 1999) documenting this
relationship. For amore detailed overview of these and other factors, see Gandolfo (2014).in the fact that the positive rate of technological change is more power-
ful in reducing income inequality when it is the product of newcomers
rather than incumbents (Bruton et al., 2013). The appreciation of the
role of entrepreneurship as a major determinant of the introduction of
innovations leads us to emphasize that the contribution of the rate of
technological change to lowering income inequality goes through a re-
duction in asymmetry in the distribution of wealth through rents. The
latter are an important component of income and income inequality is
therefore crucially determined by the effects of wealth distribution in
terms of rents.
The rate of technological change affects the rent component of in-
come distribution via four distinct mechanisms: A) the destruction of
existing capital stock; B) the entry of new firms; C) the reduction in
mark-ups andmonopolistic rents paid as dividend to shareholders of in-
cumbents; D) the increase in savingswith a consequent reduction in the
rates of interest paid to bond holders. We will now analyse them in
detail.
A) The introduction of both product and process innovations causes
creative destruction, with the wipe-out of large portions of the
existing capital. Shareholders of incumbents forced to exit the
product markets suffer losses that reduce their wealth. The rate
of technological change is thus likely to reduce the income
asymmetries stemming from an uneven distribution of wealth.
B) Considerable evidence confirms that radical innovations are gen-
erated mainly by newcomers rather than by incumbents. De-
tailed studies show that the emergence of new information and
communication technologies and biotechnologies in the second
part of the 20th century has beenprimarily the outcomeof entre-
preneurship, as in the early Schumpeter (1934), rather than cor-
porations, as in Schumpeter (1942) and Nelson and Winter
(1982). Fast rates of technological change are associated with
the creation of new firms by new entrepreneurs that are able to
challenge the incumbents bymeans of the introduction of radical
innovations. Innovations are in turn associatedwith upwardmo-
bility (Aghion et al., 2015b; Aparicio et al., 2016a, 2016b;
SanchisLlopis et al., 2015).
C) The entry of innovators engenders an increase in market rivalry
and a reduction in barriers to entry. Hence, it squeezes extra
profits and shortens the duration of accumulation of monopolis-
tic rents of incumbents (Aghion et al., 2014). Consequently, the
reduction in the levels and duration of monopolistic rents re-
duces rents in terms of the dividend paid to shareholders of in-
cumbents (the non-wage component of income) and hence
income inequality. Entrepreneurs do earn extra profits. However,
they are rarely the offspring of wealthy families: rather they
come from the middle class. Consequently, the extra profits of
newcomers help to create new stocks of wealth that start from
scratch, reducing the general levels of wealth inequality (Link
and Siegel, 2007).
D) Technological change helps increase total factor productivity and
hence labour productivity. The increase in labour productivity
has positive effects onwages. Higher levels of labour productivity
increase wages, hence the absolute levels of savings and capital
supply: interest rates gradually fall. This leads to amore symmet-
ric distribution of income due to a weakening share of income
held by bondholders.
The combined effect of the four mechanisms leads us to formulate
our main hypothesis: the faster the rate of technological change, the
lower the income inequality via its negative effects on rent inequalities.
Our hypothesis pays specific attention to the dynamics of the top in-
come levels across countries by emphasizing the comparative analysis.
Since the rate of technological change exerts its effects primarily via
creative destruction, it is expected to reduce income inequality by
89C. Antonelli, A. Gehringer / Technological Forecasting & Social Change 115 (2017) 85–98means of a reduction inwealth inequality, especially when andwhere it
is highly skewed in favour of a small fraction of the population. More-
over, the negative relationship between the rate of technological change
and income inequality is expected to have a stronger impact in coun-
tries where the income distribution is ex-ante more skewed. Because
creative destruction affects the existing stock of capital and its rents,
technological change should primarily harm the rich. If wealth is con-
centrated in a small fraction of the population, the negative effects of
the rates of introduction of innovations should be stronger in countries
where the upper quantiles of thepopulation commands a larger share of
the income because they hold a larger share of the wealth. Consequent-
ly, from an international comparative perspective, the effects of the rate
of introduction of innovations will be stronger in countries with higher
levels of income asymmetry. In countries where income inequality is
larger, wealth inequality should also be larger, and hence the effects of
the creative destruction engendered by the introduction of innovations
should be larger. To verify this hypothesis, quantile regressions are the
appropriate econometric tool.
Before testing our hypothesis econometrically, it seems useful to
note that, following Gordon (2000 and 2012), the slowdown of techno-
logical change experienced since the last decades of the 20th century
parallels the reduction in total factor productivity growth and increase
in income inequality (Piketty, 2014). This descriptive evidence may be
interpreted as a clue that the decline in technological opportunities
and reduction in the rate of introduction of technological change are a
plausible cause of the increase in income inequality. Table 1 provides
evidence on the evolution of the cost of knowledge, as measured by
R&D expenses per patent in the years 1985–2010, and of productivity
growth. This evidence shows that the unit cost of knowledge, after a
sharp reduction in the period 1985–2000, has been increasing thereaf-
ter. This seems to confirm the slowdown in technological opportunities
since the end of the 20th century. The decline in the rates of increase of
total factor productivity seems to confirm a reduction in the rates of in-
troduction of innovations. Both parallel the increase in income
asymmetries experienced since the end of the 20th century.5 We recall the relevant literature that deals with the respective advantages and draw-4. Empirical evidence
4.1. Econometric strategy
We test the hypothesis raised in the previous section in an empirical
exercise on a panel of 39 countries, over the period 1995–2011. The set
of countries is characterized by a controlled variancewith respect to the
key parameters. The data set includes only countries for which all the
relevant data are available so as to avoid the inclusion of an array of
cases for which the key variable exhibits trivial figures.4 The exclusion
of developing countries and the reduction of the span of variance to a
set of countries able to introduce technological changes is consistent
with the basic hypothesis – the Kuznets-Schumpeter line of analysis –
according to which economic growth, after the drastic discontinuity of
the transition from rural to urban economies, favours a reduction in in-
come asymmetry. This selection of the data set enables the right-hand
side of the inverted U-relationship to be tested, i.e. the hypothesis that
the faster the rate of technological change and hence economic growth
are, then the lower the levels of income asymmetry will be in countries
and historic times beyond the radical transformation. The data set in-
cludes, in fact, the industrializing countries within the European Union
such as Slovakia, Lithuania, Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria,
Poland, Estonia, Czech Republic and Slovenia and BRIC such as Brazil,
Turkey, Russia, India, China and Cyprus alongside the standard groups
of advanced countries such as United States, United Kingdom, Canada,4 Important countries such as South Korea, South Africa and Argentina could not be in-
cluded due to the lack of a full set of variables.Japan, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Denmark, Malta, Austria, Switzerland, Finland, Sweden,
Ireland, Luxemburg and Spain. This data set based on the capability to
command the introduction of technological innovations seems a reli-
able sample for testing the effects of technological change on income
distribution.
The previous discussion on the link between inequality and growth
suggests that there are numerous conceptual and methodological ca-
veats to be taken into account. First, from a conceptual point of view,
it is clear that technological change is endogenous – at least to some ex-
tent – to amore general process of economic growth so that the link be-
tween inequality and innovation could be signed by two-way causality.
This challenges the estimation strategywith obvious simultaneity prob-
lems. Consequently, to deal with the issue, we corroborate our baseline
results by running the original static regressionswith lagged explanato-
ry variables.
Second, applying an adequate measure of technological change is
not obvious. Due to the complex nature of technological change, we ac-
knowledge that there is no single indicator that optimally measures it,
but that each one has its advantages and limitations. Among possible
candidates, R&D expenditure, a typical input measure, has been more
and more criticized for its limitations. Recent advances in the literature
stress that, next to R&D,manyother relevant inputs play a central role in
the generation of new technological knowledge and in the eventual in-
troduction of innovation. Total factor productivity - an alternative indi-
cator of the rate of technological change - suffers from many
equilibrium assumptions. Its reliability may be limited, especially in a
context characterized by long-term development, with major changes
in the structure and organization of the underlying economic systems.
Past empirical studies using patent-related indicators often applied
some measures to account for differences in the quality of individual
patents. For instance, Jaffe et al. (1993) use patent citations, whereas
Aghion et al. (2005) refer to citation-weighted patent grants. Since we
are interested in flows of newly available knowledge, we consider pat-
ent applications as themost suitable measure of technological progress.
Moreover, the increasing evidence of the actual meaning of patent cita-
tions suggests relying on the sheer number of patents without
attempting to use citations as a proxy for their quality. As a matter of
fact, it is now clear that citations to other patents are included by patent
officers to better specify the borders of the domain of the intellectual
property right rather than their quality (Van Zeebroeck, 2011 and Van
Zeebroeck and van Pottelsberghe, 2011). In view of such limitations,
our choice is to make use of patent counts, a typical measure of the out-
put of the innovative process, which is able to approximate well the
generation of technological knowledge actually dedicated to economic
applications.
This is a flowmeasure that directly reflects the increase in the stock
of technological knowledge available in an economic system.5 Accord-
ingly, patents have been extensively used in the management and eco-
nomics literature to measure knowledge flows (e.g., Griliches, 1990;
Jaffe et al., 1993 and 1998; Almeida and Kogut, 1999; Popp, 2003 and
2005; Alcacer and Gittelman, 2006). As such, patent data are potentially
more precise than other measures of innovation since they refer to con-
crete and successfully terminated knowledge generating activities that
are the result of the recombination of codified knowledge based on re-
search and development efforts and the stock of tacit knowledge
based upon learning processes.
Third, we bear inmind themany issues - and limitations - connected
with the measurement of income inequality. Following Aghion et al.backs connected with the use of patent data to measure productivity (see, for instance,
Griliches, 1990; Napolitano and Sirilli, 1990; Popp, 2005). Nevertheless, in our context,
where we are particularly interested in the distribution of income, the count of patents
seems to measure remunerable technological change more reliably than some measures
of factor productivity, be it the growth of total factor productivity or labour productivity.
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income of a household.6 This is calculated by summing up the personal
income gained by each member of a household and non-labour income
received at the household level. In thisway, disposable income includes:
income from work (wages of employed persons and earnings of the
self-employed), private income from investment and property, trans-
fers between households, all social transfers received in cash (including
old-age pensions). We measure income inequality with the Gini coeffi-
cient, quintiles of income distribution and ratios between them.
Finally, there are reasons for preferring multi-year averaged data to
annual observations. First, given that some of our variables are
expressed in terms of growth rates, they are relatively noisy at annual
frequency. Second, by averaging the annual observations, we avoid the
possible influence of the business cycle. Third, the estimations based
on multi-year averages are more adequate for offering medium-term
conclusions in the investigation of the underlying hypothesis. Conse-
quently, to study our main specifications, we transform our annual
data into 4-year averages.7
Bearing in mind the considerations outlined in the previous section,
the implications of our conceptual design for the empirical investigation
could be very different if the mean inequality reduction were uneven
along the distribution of the Gini coefficient.
Indeed, application of mean linear estimation methods implies that
with respect to each point on the conditional distribution, the estimates
of the relationship between inequality and the explanatory variables re-
main the same. This assumptionmay be restrictive and to test the relative
importance of the factors determining income inequality at different
points of the conditional distribution, it is appropriate to apply quantile
regression. Nonetheless, we did mean linear estimations as well. For the
pooledOLS aswell aswhenapplying feasibleGLSmethods, the estimation
results performed reasonably well. We could not conclude the same for
the fixed effects (FE) estimations.8 This is due to the fact that the cross-
sectional variability of our main variables in our sample is high with re-
spect to the within variation. Instead, the fixed effects model uses only
the within variation and eliminates the between variation. As a conse-
quence, after eliminating the cross-sectional variation at the mean of
the FE estimations, no reasonable results can be obtained. Appendix A re-
ports the results from different mean linear estimations.
The general form of the regression model for the θth quantile with
0 ≤ θ ≤ 1, as first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978), can be writ-
ten as:
Q θ yit jXitð Þ ¼ X0itβθ ð1Þ
where yit is the dependent variable (Gini coefficient) in country i at time
t. Vector Xit′ contains the set of explanatory variables as listed and ex-
plained below andβθ is the vector of the regression coefficients to be es-
timated. Regression coefficients for different quantiles can be directly
compared to each other.
The dependent variable (Ineq) is an indicator of income inequality
which in our baseline case is given by the Gini coefficient.9 Regarding6 In his recent book, Thomas Piketty raises concerns regarding the indicators of income
inequality usually used in the applied work (Gini coefficient, quantile ratios) mainly be-
cause theymask somepart of the evolution taking placewithin the economy (for instance,
at the very top of the distribution). This notwithstanding, as afirst step in the investigation
at stake, we believe there is scope for examining how technological change impacts the
distribution of income in a society as a whole, across all classes of income.
7 There is no consensus regarding the use of 4-, 5-year or other frequency of averages.
Quite often 5-year averages have been investigated, butwithout providing a clearmotiva-
tion for the choice. We opt for 4-year averages to maximize the number of observations
per country. Our database ranges between 1995 and 2011, but to obtain our 4-year aver-
ages, we exclude 1995 which reported many missing values.
8 A similar performance of the pooled versus FE mean estimations was documented in
Ohinata and van Ours (2012)when studying spillover effects of immigrants on the perfor-
mance of students. Consequently, their main methodological choice was quantile
regression.
9 On the origins of the Gini coefficient, see Ceriani and Verme (2012).our explanatory variables, one of themain two factors is Tech and stands
for the introduction of innovation which we proxy with the count of
patent applications. Based on our arguments regarding technological
change, we would expect that if the Tech variable exerts a positive im-
pact on income distribution, we should see a negative estimation
coefficient.
Other controls include: open which measures trade openness,
GDPcap which stands for GDP per capita, gov which measures govern-
ment spending - both as a percentage of GDP - and FI which is an indi-
cator of international financial integration. Such variables are
commonly referred to when investigating the determinants of wage in-
equality (for amore detailed discussion, see Roine et al. (2009)).10More
precisely, as discussed in Section 2, the impact of trade openness on in-
equality may be both positive and negative, depending on the forces at
work. If intensified trade reduces barriers in domestic markets and gen-
erates favourable conditions for the operating ofmoreworkable compe-
tition,more equal incomedistribution should follow (Roine et al., 2009).
If, on the other hand, trade openness enhances the expansion of produc-
tive scale, with the positive impact on either demand for skilled labour,
or rent extraction, or both, income inequality (also via increasing skill
premia) may increase. Which effect prevails is an empirical question.
Regarding GDP per capita, since our sample is dominated by countries
in advanced stages of development, we could expect the stage of eco-
nomic development to have an inequality reducing effect. Indeed, in
line with our previous discussion, improvements in GDP per capita –
possible thanks to the increase in the general level of wages – could en-
hance income distribution in general. Moreover, as GDP per capita can
be seen as measuring the stage of development, the latter may go
hand in hand with the adoption of redistributive instruments. Never-
theless, the opposite outcome cannot be excluded, depending on the
pro-egalitarian preferences of a society (Guillaud, 2013). Government
spending is aimed at capturing the contribution of social policy to a re-
duction in income inequality. The impact of financial integration on in-
equality is unsure.11 If financialmarketswork imperfectly, favouring the
inefficient allocation of financial capital, the beneficial effects of a reduc-
tion in interest rates will not occur and the negative consequences on
income distribution will be magnified. The opposite is to be expected,
if financial market imperfections are substantial.
Fig. B1 in Appendix B gives a first impression of the influence of sin-
gle explanatory variables onmean income inequality.Whereas the rela-
tionship seems towork at the unconditionalmean, the precise impact of
such factors along the conditional distribution should be clarified in an
empirical exercise.
4.2. Data description
The Gini coefficient is taken from Eurostat and for countries not cov-
ered by Eurostat, we use theWorld Bank Development Indicators data-
base. Gini coefficient is defined as the relationship of cumulative shares
of the population segregated according to the level of equalized dispos-
able income to the cumulative share of the equalized total disposable in-
come. If the coefficient is equal to zero, this means there is a perfectly
equal income distribution, whereas a Gini coefficient of one indicates
maximum inequality between the individual incomes. According to
the Eurostat definition, the total disposable income of a household is
calculated by summing up the personal income gained by eachmember
of a household and non-labour income received at the household level.
In this way, disposable income includes: income from work (wages of
employed persons and earnings of the self-employed), private income10 Additionally, in separate estimationsnot reportedhere,we included the square ofGDP
per capita – as a commonway of testing the standard Kuznets hypothesis – but it was al-
ways insignificant, in line with the mixed empirical evidence of a dedicated strand of the
literature (Jha, 1996; Mushinsky, 2001).
11 The ongoing discussion in the literature concerning the growth and welfare effects of
progressing financial globalization is far from conclusive. For a comprehensive review on
the issue, see Kose et al. (2009).
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transfers received in cash (including old-age pensions).
In the sensitivity analysis, other measures of income inequality
expressed as quantiles of income distribution are used instead of the
Gini index. More precisely, we consider the ratio between the fifth
and the first quantile of income distribution. However, the data reliabil-
ity is limited here, due to a number of missing observations.
The patent variable refers to the ratio between the number of patent
applicationsmade each year directly toWIPO andnational phase entries
and GDP at constant U.S. dollars prices. In this way, weweight the abso-
lute number of patents by the size of the economy.
The PennWorld Tables are the source used for our measure of trade
openness (openk) and government spending in percentage to GDP (kg).
From World Economic Outlook we take GDP per capita (expressed in
millions of PPP current international dollars).
Finally, as a measure of financial integration, we apply a de jure indi-
cator taken from an updated database developed by Chinn and Ito
(2008).12 This indicator is obtained in an estimation procedure, based
on a principal componentsmodel. The authors use thedata from theAn-
nual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions
(AREAER) by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In the construc-
tion of the index, information is used on the presence (or absence) of
multiple exchange rates, on restrictions on current account and capital
account transactions, and on the requirement of the surrender of export
proceeds. This index covers all the countries and years included in our
sample.
Descriptive statistics of the variables are included in Table C1 of
Appendix C.4.3. Results
Table 2 summarizes the main results of the quantile regressions.
Generally, the results confirm the evidence of a strong inequality-
reducing effect of technological change.13 This result is, however, insig-
nificant (or at best only weakly significant) in the first three quantiles.
This implies that the inequality reducing effects of the rate of technolog-
ical change start to operate only at a certain level of income inequality
and increasewith the levels of income inequality.14 The econometric re-
sults change considerablywith the deciles of the Gini concentration: the
estimated parameter of Tech is 0.032 and is insignificant for Q10,
0.042 at a 5% significance levels for Q40, and 0.094 at a 1% significance
levels for Q90. These results show that the effects of the rate of techno-
logical change, both in terms of the estimated value of the parameter
and its statistical reliability, are stronger, the stronger the levels of in-
come inequality are. This in turn may be considered a strong clue to
the strength of the relationship between the rate of technological
change and the rent component of disposable income. High levels of in-
come inequality, in fact, reflect high levels of wealth inequality.
In general, our evidence suggests that a one unit increase in patent
share over GDP provokes a reduction in income inequality of around 7
to 10%. Since the patent share grew in the observed sample at an aver-
age yearly rate of 0.2%, income inequality due to innovation was re-
duced by 1.4%.
Regarding the other control variables, all of them, with the remark-
able exception of the index of financial integration, contributed to the12 There are numerous measures of financial liberalization. Due to the date availability
issue, we use a de jure indicator. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) develop a broadly used
measure of de factofinancial liberalization that, however, ends in 2004 anddoesnot there-
fore cover several years in our observation sample. For a discussion on the advantages and
drawbacks of using a de jure and non de facto measure of financial integration, see Kose
et al. (2009) and Gehringer (2013 and 2015).
13 The inequality reducing effect of technological change is also confirmed in estimations
excluding control variables. We report these results in Table B1 in Appendix B.
14 This is in line with the findings of Archibugi and Pietrobelli (2003) who find that the
globalization of technology has a positive impact on developing countries provided that
adequate policies in support of adoption of innovation are introduced.reduction in income inequality. In particular, for trade openness, we re-
port negative estimation coefficients for all quantiles of incomedistribu-
tion, with the strongest effect in the first three quantiles. This suggests
that intensifying trade relations played a role in reducing income dis-
parities and, moreover, that at lower levels of income inequality the
magnitude of the effect was greater. Finally, based on the composition
of our sample, our findings should be only limitedly comparable with
the outcomes of past investigations. Consequently, the result should
be interpreted in relation to the specific country composition and less
as a support for any particular outcome from the past empirical
literature.
The negative coefficient found for GDP per capita strictly relates to
our conceptual design previously discussed. Indeed, the increase in
GDP per capita, implicitly stemming from an increase in wages, leads
to a reduction in income inequalities. Finally, the result regarding finan-
cial liberalization is in line with the outcomes obtained by Rajan and
Zingales (2003) and by Ang (2010), the last investigating the case of
India in a co-integration framework.
4.4. Sensitivity analysis
4.4.1. Estimations on lagged explanatory variables
We are mindful of the potential endogeneity concerns when
analysing the relationship between income inequality and technological
change. Indeed, the level of inequality may be influential on the
country's ability to promote technological improvements.
As our robustness check in this regard, we lagged the explanatory
variables by one period to verify whether our main results are still
valid. It has to be noted, however, that by laggingwe lose some informa-
tion so that these results are not directly comparablewith the ones from
the baselinemodel. Nonetheless, they showwhether the direction of in-
fluence remains consistentwith the estimationswith contemporaneous
observations.
Table 3 summarizes the estimated results which corroborate our
previous conclusions: income inequality diminishes at higher rates of
technological change. The strong relationship between the rates of tech-
nological change and the quantiles exhibits again increasing effects that
are stronger at higher quantiles of income inequality.
4.4.2. Direction of technological change and the skill content
Our primary scope is to assess the overall impact of the rate of tech-
nological change on income inequality. This notwithstanding, with the
aim of better linking our contribution to the previous literature on the
inequality consequences of skill-biased technological change, we verify
here how the direction and the skills-intensity of technological change
may have worked out their influence in the context of our sample. In
line with the conceptual developments made in the established litera-
ture (Solow, 1957; Antonelli and Quatraro, 2014), we apply the Euler's
law to represent the direction of technological change in terms of the
share of labour over total output produced in an economy. Indeed, as
capital use in production increases due to new capital-intensive tech-
nologies, the share of labour over output decreases. Nevertheless, this
measure does not necessarily account for the skills content of techno-
logical change.We therefore introduce a variable that measures the rel-
ative skills intensity in an economy (human), measured in terms of the
percentage share of the population with the tertiary educational attain-
ment (taken from Eurostat). Additionally, sincewe presume that the di-
rection of technological change possibly works together with the
intensity of skills in an economy, we generate an interaction term be-
tween the two variables (labshare ∗ human).We expect the tests to con-
firm that the direction of technological change experienced in the last
decades increases income inequality via the wage-inequality effects of
the skill bias. Moreover, we expect the interaction term
(labshare ∗ human) to capture the effects of the distribution of skills
exhibiting a negative sign. The rationale should be clear. For given levels
of labour intensity of the new technology, the larger the share of
15 For a comprehensive review of different methods to measure inequality, see Jenkins
and Van Kerm (2006).
Table 2
Results from estimations of determinants of income inequality based on baseline specification and using quantile regressions.
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient
Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Tech −0.032 −0.047⁎ −0.040 −0.042⁎⁎ −0.055⁎⁎ −0.060⁎⁎⁎ −0.077⁎⁎⁎ −0.076⁎⁎⁎ −0.094⁎⁎⁎
(0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024)
open −0.085⁎⁎⁎ −0.087⁎⁎⁎ −0.066⁎⁎ −0.080⁎⁎⁎ −0.071⁎⁎⁎ −0.062⁎⁎⁎ −0.063⁎⁎⁎ −0.056⁎⁎⁎ −0.055⁎⁎⁎
(0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
GDPcap −0.013⁎ −0.015⁎⁎ −0.016⁎⁎ −0.021⁎⁎ −0.019⁎⁎ −0.019⁎⁎ −0.015⁎⁎ −0.010⁎ −0.015⁎⁎
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
gov −0.300⁎⁎⁎ −0.256⁎⁎⁎ −0.259⁎⁎⁎ −0.394⁎⁎⁎ −0.406⁎⁎⁎ −0.427⁎⁎⁎ −0.449⁎⁎⁎ −0.438⁎⁎⁎ −0.425⁎⁎⁎
(0.075) (0.072) (0.069) (0.068) (0.053) (0.052) (0.051) (0.057) (0.096)
FI 1.465⁎⁎ 0.761 0.520 0.759⁎ 0.737⁎⁎ 0.456 0.228 −0.485 −4.568⁎⁎
(0.602) (0.702) (0.587) (0.388) (0.342) (0.461) (0.728) (1.264) (2.149)
N. obs. 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130 130
Pseudo R-sq. 0.327 0.312 0.335 0.370 0.397 0.409 0.408 0.413 0.451
Note: Dependent variable is the Gini index taken from the Eurostat. Techmeasures the rate of technological change and is expressed as a ratio between the count of patent applications at
WIPO and GDP at constant U.S. dollar prices (from OECD STAN).Open is a measure of trade openness and is taken from PennWorld Tables. It is given by a share of total trade by a country
(imports and exports) over the country's GDP. GDPcap is GDP per capita inmillions of PPP current international dollars and is taken from theWorld Economic Outlook. Gov is ameasure of
government spending as a percentage of GDP, as defined by PennWorld Tables. Finally, FI refers to an indicator offinancial integration, as defined by Chinn and Ito (2008). All variables are
4-year averaged over the time span 1996–2011. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎ and ⁎ indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis.
Table 3
Quantile regressions of baseline model with lagged determinants of income inequality.
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient at time t
Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Techt−1 −0.021 −0.027 −0.025 −0.023 −0.047⁎⁎ −0.055⁎⁎ −0.050⁎⁎ −0.052⁎⁎ −0.060⁎⁎
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.027)
open t−1 −0.097⁎⁎⁎ −0.064⁎⁎ −0.060⁎⁎ −0.062⁎⁎ −0.064⁎⁎⁎ −0.061⁎⁎⁎ −0.069⁎⁎⁎ −0.067⁎⁎⁎ −0.067⁎⁎⁎
(0.030) (0.030) (0.025) (0.023) (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.010)
GDPcap t−1 −0.271⁎⁎⁎ −0.166⁎⁎ −0.179⁎⁎ −0.181⁎⁎ −0.183⁎⁎ −0.157⁎⁎ −0.132⁎⁎ −0.143⁎⁎ −0.103⁎⁎
(0.083) (0.083) (0.080) (0.071) (0.069) (0.074) (0.058) (0.056) (0.050)
gov t−1 −0.199⁎⁎ −0.424⁎⁎⁎ −0.394⁎⁎⁎ −0.373⁎⁎⁎ −0.339⁎⁎⁎ −0.382⁎⁎⁎ −0.431⁎⁎⁎ −0.436⁎⁎⁎ −0.390⁎⁎⁎
(0.095) (0.069) (0.055) (0.064) (0.069) (0.067) (0.069) (0.064) (0.069)
FI t−1 1.535⁎⁎ 1.464⁎⁎ 1.404⁎⁎ 1.025 0.892 0.325 0.191 0.084 −4.935⁎⁎
(0.779) (0.640) (0.517) (0.638) (0.587) (0.436) (0.412) (1.183) (2.315)
N. obs. 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96
Pseudo R-sq. 0.336 0.347 0.401 0.433 0.451 0.455 0.463 0.460 0.489
Note: Dependent variable is the Gini index. For a definition of the explanatory variables, see note to Table 2. All variables are 4-year averaged over the time span 1996–2011. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎ and ⁎
indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis.
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ing effects should be. This reasoning is clearly confirmed in our estima-
tion results (Table 4).
4.4.3. Estimations on different quantiles of income inequality distribution
Our previous estimations regard quantiles that are evenly spread
along the income inequality distribution. Now we want to check how
previous results are affected if we take a different set of quantiles, name-
ly, Q1, Q25, Q50, Q75 and Q99. The results are summarized in Table 5
below. In particular, in panel a)we report the results for specifications
analogous to the ones included in Table 2, whereas in panel b)we addi-
tionally include the human capital variable (human) aswell as the inter-
action term between the latter and the labour share variable
(labshare ∗ human). The results in both panels broadly confirm the pre-
vious results with the rate of technological change exercising an in-
equality reducing impact and the skill-biased direction of
technological change working against the inequality reduction.
4.4.4. Alternative measures of income inequality
As our main measure of income inequality we adopt the Gini index
that is the most commonly used and most available inequality index.
Nevertheless, there are numerous other possible measures that have
been identified in the past literature and used in empiricalinvestigations.15 One alternative is given by considering quantile shares
or ratios between different quantiles of within country income distribu-
tion. For instance, in addition to the Gini index, Panizza (2002) applies
the share of the third quintile (Q3) of the income distribution, whereas
Xu and Zou (2000) study the fifth (Q5), the first (Q1), the third and
fourth together (Q34), and the ratio between the fifth and the first
(Q5/Q1) quintile. All are supposed to express the changing proportions
of the overall income distribution of the rich (Q5), the poor (Q1), the
middle class (Q34) and the relative share relating to the two extreme
classes (Q5/Q1). Apart from the practical reasons of worse data avail-
ability, an important drawback of such quintile (or also percentile)mea-
sures of income inequality is that they ignore a piece of information
concerning the shares of distribution other than those selected. The
Gini index, on the contrary, summarizes the information over the entire
income distribution. This notwithstanding, and bearing in mind the un-
derlying limitations, we apply three alternative quintile-based mea-
sures of income inequality, namely, Q5 and the two ratios, Q5/Q1 and
Q5/Q3. As the results were comparable between the three measures,
we report the results regarding the ratio Q5/Q1.
Table 4
Quantile regressions of determinants of income inequality with a test of role of skill-biased direction of technological change.
Dependent variable: Gini coefficient
Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Tech −0.034 −0.046 −0.054⁎⁎ −0.061⁎⁎⁎ −0.076⁎⁎⁎ −0.075⁎⁎ −0.088⁎⁎ −0.082⁎⁎ −0.099⁎⁎
(0.035) (0.033) (0.025) (0.023) (0.026) (0.030) (0.039) (0.040) (0.046)
labshare 0.476⁎ 0.641⁎⁎⁎ 0.798⁎⁎⁎ 0.745⁎⁎⁎ 0.769⁎⁎⁎ 0.640⁎⁎ 0.608⁎⁎ 0.718⁎⁎ 1.040⁎⁎⁎
(0.280) (0.232) (0.205) (0.198) (0.246) (0.245) (0.260) (0.290) (0.249)
human 2.080⁎⁎ 2.360⁎⁎⁎ 2.320⁎⁎⁎ 2.360⁎⁎⁎ 2.690⁎⁎⁎ 2.390⁎⁎ 2.540⁎⁎ 2.770⁎⁎ 3.650⁎⁎⁎
(1.001) (0.822) (0.825) (0.743) (0.946) (0.918) (1.020) (1.190) (1.130)
labshare ∗ human −0.036⁎⁎ −0.042⁎⁎⁎ −0.042⁎⁎⁎ −0.044⁎⁎⁎ −0.049⁎⁎⁎ −0.043⁎⁎ −0.045⁎⁎ −0.049⁎⁎ −0.068⁎⁎⁎
(0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.021)
open −0.106⁎⁎⁎ −0.092⁎⁎⁎ −0.071⁎⁎⁎ −0.068⁎⁎⁎ −0.066⁎⁎⁎ −0.062⁎⁎⁎ −0.058⁎⁎⁎ −0.064⁎⁎⁎ −0.054⁎⁎⁎
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
GDPcap −0.031⁎⁎⁎ −0.020⁎⁎ −0.024⁎⁎⁎ −0.019⁎⁎⁎ −0.019⁎⁎⁎ −0.013⁎⁎ −0.012⁎ −0.012⁎ −0.015⁎⁎
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
gov −0.194 −0.337⁎⁎ −0.434⁎⁎⁎ −0.399⁎⁎⁎ −0.347⁎⁎⁎ −0.388⁎⁎⁎ −0.368⁎⁎⁎ −0.302⁎⁎⁎ −0.206⁎⁎
(0.144) (0.132) (0.100) (0.082) (0.064) (0.052) (0.071) (0.082) (0.099)
FI 0.826 0.668 0.858 1.010⁎⁎ 1.280⁎⁎⁎ 0.814⁎⁎ 0.893⁎⁎ 1.080⁎⁎ 0.711
(0.567) (0.629) (0.525) (0.489) −0.362 (0.343) (0.431) (0.533) (0.607)
N. obs. 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Pseudo R-sq. 0.385 0.349 0.394 0.437 0.455 0.475 0.482 0.480 0.492
Note: Dependent variable is the Gini index. Labshare is the share of labour over the output produced in the economy.Human is the share of population with a tertiary educational degree.
Both variables are constructed based on statistical information taken from the Eurostat. For a definition of the other explanatory variables, see note to Table 2. All variables are 4-year av-
eraged over the time span 1996–2011. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎ and ⁎ indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis.
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firm those obtained previously regarding the technological variables
(although the estimated effects are never significant at 1% level) and
also the other controls. The only difference, though remarkable, regards
the testing for the direction of technological change. In particular, bothTable 5
Quantile based on alternative definition of quintiles.
Q01 Q25
a)
Tech −0.075⁎⁎ −0.022
(0.031) (0.026)
open −0.097⁎⁎⁎ −0.084⁎⁎⁎
(0.017) (0.019)
GDPcap −0.027⁎⁎⁎ −0.014⁎
(0.001) (0.007)
gov −0.159⁎ −0.295⁎⁎⁎
(0.093) (0.084)
FI 2.457⁎⁎⁎ 0.600
(0.697) (0.608)
N. obs. 130 130
Pseudo R-sq. 0.374 0.319
b)
Tech −0.045 −0.053⁎
(0.036) (0.031)
labshare 0.569 0.704⁎⁎
(0.364) (0.315)
human 1.280 2.100⁎⁎
(1.100) (1.050)
labshare ∗ human −0.023 −0.038⁎⁎
(0.020) (0.018)
open −0.107⁎⁎⁎ −0.076⁎⁎⁎
(0.022) (0.024)
GDPcap −0.029⁎⁎⁎ −0.025⁎⁎
(0.010) (0.010)
gov −0.282⁎ −0.415⁎⁎⁎
(0.163) (0.120)
FI 0.492 1.140⁎⁎
(0.602) (0.513)
N. obs. 100 100
Pseudo R-sq. 0.485 0.367
Note: Dependent variable is the Gini index. For a definition of the explanatory variables, see not
and ⁎ indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bootstrapped standard errors awhen considered in terms of the labour share over income (Table 6a)
andwhen accounting for the actual skills-intensity (Table 6b), the effect
of the direction of technological change remained insignificant,
although the estimated coefficients show the expected signs. This
difference in the results between the adoption of the Gini coefficientQ50 Q75 Q99
−0.055⁎⁎⁎ −0.070⁎⁎⁎ −0.145⁎⁎
(0.016) (0.020) (0.047)
−0.071⁎⁎⁎ −0.052⁎⁎⁎ −0.047⁎⁎
(0.015) (0.013) (0.016)
−0.018⁎⁎ −0.012⁎ −0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
−0.406⁎⁎⁎ −0.418⁎⁎⁎ −0.407⁎⁎⁎
(0.049) (0.055) (0.101)
0.737 −0.456 −5.138⁎⁎
(0.482) (1.099) (1.887)
130 130 130
0.397 0.411 0.690
−0.076⁎⁎⁎ −0.070⁎⁎ −0.153⁎⁎⁎
(0.021) (0.034) (0.047)
0.769⁎⁎⁎ 0.861⁎⁎⁎ 1.050⁎⁎
(0.220) (0.309) (0.406)
2.690⁎⁎⁎ 3.290⁎⁎ 4.180⁎⁎
(0.990) (1.350) (1.600)
−0.049⁎⁎⁎ −0.060⁎⁎ −0.076⁎⁎
(0.018) (0.025) (0.030)
−0.066⁎⁎⁎ −0.063⁎⁎⁎ −0.064⁎⁎⁎
(0.017) (0.013) (0.014)
−0.019⁎⁎⁎ −0.014⁎⁎ −0.015⁎⁎
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
−0.347⁎⁎⁎ −0.324⁎⁎⁎ −0.191
(0.082) (0.095) (0.121)
1.280⁎⁎⁎ 1.020⁎⁎⁎ 0.991
(0.356) (0.384) (0.719)
100 100 100
0.455 0.477 0.672
e to Tables 2 and 4. All variables are 4-year averaged over the time span 1996–2011. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎
re in parenthesis.
Table 6a
Quantile regressions of determinants of income inequality based on alternative measure of income inequality.
Dependent variable: ratio between Q5 and Q1 of the (within country) income distribution
Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
Tech −0.011⁎ −0.013⁎ −0.017⁎⁎ −0.013 −0.012 −0.016⁎⁎ −0.017⁎⁎ −0.022⁎⁎⁎ −0.018⁎⁎
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
open −0.020⁎⁎⁎ −0.020⁎⁎⁎ −0.018⁎⁎⁎ −0.018⁎⁎⁎ −0.016⁎⁎⁎ −0.015⁎⁎⁎ −0.012⁎⁎ −0.009⁎⁎ −0.011⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
GDPcap −0.059⁎⁎ −0.076⁎⁎⁎ −0.066⁎⁎⁎ −0.064⁎⁎⁎ −0.067⁎⁎⁎ −0.068⁎⁎ −0.054⁎⁎ −0.067⁎⁎ −0.066⁎⁎
(0.029) (0.021) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.027) (0.025)
gov −0.050⁎ −0.053⁎⁎ −0.069⁎⁎ −0.083⁎⁎ −0.092⁎⁎⁎ −0.095⁎⁎⁎ −0.083⁎⁎⁎ −0.074⁎⁎⁎ −0.065⁎⁎
(0.027) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.020) (0.024)
FI 0.160 0.363⁎ 0.089 0.044 −0.003 −0.081 −0.570 −1.047 −5.800⁎⁎
(0.293) (0.193) (0.181) (0.153) (0.211) (0.846) (1.377) (2.352) (2.326)
N. obs. 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97
Pseudo R-sq. 0.171 0.220 0.265 0.307 0.331 0.336 0.327 0.330 0.575
Note: Dependent variable is given by the ratio between the fifth and first quintile (Q5/Q1). For a definition of the explanatory variables, see note to Table 2. All variables are 4-year non-
overlapping averages over the period 1996–2011. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎ and ⁎ indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis.
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different informational contents of the two indicators as explained be-
fore. Second, there is a difference in the data availability: it was better
for the Gini coefficient than for the single quintiles.
Once more we note that the effects of the rate of introduction of
technological changes increase with the levels of income inequality as
identified by the quantiles considered. The effects are negligible in
countries where the income inequality is low, but increase both in
terms of statistical significance and size of the estimated parameter in
countries with higher levels of income inequality.
5. Conclusion
Increasing levels of income inequality are attracting much research.
The literature has concentrated on the hypothesis that increasing levels
of income inequality are the cause of slow growth and social unbal-
ances. This paper contributes to exploring an alternative hypothesis ac-
cording to which increasing levels of income inequality are the
consequence, rather than the cause, of slow growth and, moreTable 6b
Quantile regressions of determinants of income inequality based on an alternative measure of
Dependent variable: ratio between Q5 and Q1 of the (within coun
Q10 Q20 Q30 Q40
Tech −0.016 −0.010 −0.013 −0.018⁎⁎
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
labshare 0.058 0.023 0.041 0.020
(0.058) (0.074) (0.071) (0.076)
human 0.147 −0.129 −0.049 −0.041
(0.278) (0.269) (0.268) (0.312)
labshare ∗ human −0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
open −0.012⁎⁎ −0.023⁎⁎⁎ −0.021⁎⁎⁎ −0.016⁎⁎⁎
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
GDPcap −0.060⁎⁎⁎ −0.067⁎⁎⁎ −0.081⁎⁎⁎ −0.079⁎⁎⁎
(0.018) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
gov −0.080⁎⁎⁎ −0.093⁎⁎ −0.086⁎⁎⁎ −0.061⁎⁎
(0.023) (0.035) (0.031) (0.025)
FI 0.094 0.216 0.421 0.437
(0.544) (0.305) (0.321) (0.279)
N. obs. 74 74 74 74
Pseudo R-sq. 0.324 0.336 0.371 0.440
Note: Dependent variable is given by the ratio between the fifth and first quintile (Q5/Q1). For
non-overlapping averages over the period 1996–2011. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎ and ⁎ indicate significance level aspecifically, of the slowingpace of technological change. Indeed, very lit-
tle investigation has beenmade into the role of the rate of technological
change – as distinct from its direction – as a crucial component of the
dynamics of income distribution associated with economic growth.
Building on amore comprehensive reappraisal of the Schumpeterian
legacy in our analysis that appreciates the role of entrepreneurship in
assessing the rates of introduction of technological innovations, we
demonstrate that the rate of technological change – as measured by
the flow of patents – and the consequent effects of the creative destruc-
tion on the distribution of wealth and their rents plays a crucial role in
reducing income asymmetries. Slow rates of technological change
help to consolidate barriers to entry and limit theworking of price com-
petition. The transfer of increased efficiency to the final consumer is
substantially delayed. The owners of wealth can take advantage of en-
during high-level monopolistic rents. When, on the other hand, the
rate of technological change is high, with the frequent introduction of
innovations stirred bymarket rivalry among competitors, the successive
waves of creative destruction reduce barriers to entry and trim the du-
ration of transient monopolistic rents. In this way, technological changeincome inequality and verifying role of skilled-biased direction of technological change.
try) income distribution
Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90
−0.020⁎⁎ −0.023⁎ −0.021⁎ −0.018 −0.022⁎⁎
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.010)
0.049 0.058 0.070 0.057 0.036
(0.065) (0.061) (0.064) (0.068) (0.090)
0.131 0.170 0.297 0.223 0.169
(0.294) (0.275) (0.261) (0.273) (0.342)
−0.003 −0.003 −0.005 −0.004 −0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
−0.011⁎ −0.0127⁎⁎ −0.011⁎⁎ −0.008 −0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
−0.064⁎⁎⁎ −0.049⁎⁎ −0.059⁎⁎⁎ −0.086⁎⁎⁎ −0.088⁎⁎⁎
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.019)
−0.078⁎⁎⁎ −0.082⁎⁎⁎ −0.086⁎⁎⁎ −0.082⁎⁎⁎ −0.071⁎⁎⁎
(0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.023) (0.022)
0.469 0.149 0.305 −0.849 −0.873
(0.332) (0.561) (0.626) (0.644) (0.654)
74 74 74 74 74
0.484 0.513 0.527 0.549 0.639
a definition of the explanatory variables, see note to Tables 2 and 4. All variables are 4-year
t 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis.
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via a reduction in rents. Specifically, the introduction of innovations
trims rents for three reasons. First, the old vintages of installed capital
are destroyed and their owners incur substantial reductions in their
wealth. Second, the extra profits stemming from the introduction of in-
novation are quickly eroded by the following mechanisms: the reduc-
tion in monopolistic rents limits the asymmetric income advantages of
wealth owners, i.e. shareholders; the levels of profit decline together
with its distribution through dividends to shareholders; finally, fast
technological change enhances productivity. The benefits of an increase
in productivity are quickly transferred to the final consumer with posi-
tive effects on savings and the supply of capital. This, in turn, leads to a
decline in interest rates paid to bondholders with a further reduction in
rent asymmetries.
The results of our comparative econometric test on a large and co-
herent international sample of countries able to command the introduc-
tion of technological change fully confirm the Schumpeterian
hypothesis that the faster the rate of introduction of innovation, the
lower the levels of income inequality. Moreover, the results of the
quantile regressions show that the effects of the rate of introduction of
technological change are stronger, the higher the levels of income in-
equality. This, in turn, seems to support the strong relationship between
the rate of technological change and the rent component of disposable
income. High levels of income inequality, in fact, reflect high levels of
wealth inequality. Top income levels aremost affected by the rates of in-
troduction of innovations because of their strong equalizing effects on
the distribution of the stocks of wealth and related rents. The
Schumpeterian creative destruction displays its effects all the more in
countries where income distribution is more skewed towards the
wealthy because it primarily affects the wealth of incumbents and, con-
sequently, mainly reduces the top incomes based on rents.
In a sensitivity check, we were also able to confirm the hypothesis
that the recent trends of technological change directed towards theTe
op
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h
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Ruse of skilledmanpower with formal training contributes to an increase
in income inequality via wage inequality, especially when and where
the low levels of human capital enable small groups of talentedworkers
to appropriate large shares of revenue. These results confirm that our
hypothesis regarding the negative effects of the rate of introduction of
technological change on rent and consequently income inequality com-
plements the results of the literature that has explored the effects of the
direction of technological change on wage and hence income inequal-
ities. The two hypotheses complement each other in providing a com-
prehensive reappraisal of the Schumpeterian legacy.
Policy implications are quite important. Innovation policies that
are able to support the rates of introduction of innovations, together
with competition policies, are the most effective tools for reducing
income inequality. Innovation policies aimed at fostering the rate
of introduction of technological changes are one of themost effective
tools for reducing income inequalities. Competition policy can play a
central role in reducing income inequality stemming from rents,
especially in product markets where price competition is limited
by barriers to entry and to imitation, based on exclusive cost advan-
tages that draw their origin from previous technological vintages.
From this viewpoint, innovation and competition policies are
complementary.Acknowledgments
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Ourmain estimation framework is based on quantile regressions to account for the fact that the influence of the explanatory variables on the depen-
dent variable may be different along its distribution. Nevertheless, it may be interesting to compare these results with the effects at the mean of in-
come inequality distribution. For this reason, we re-estimate our basic regression with three different methods, namely, Pooled OLS, FGLS and FE.
Table A1 reports the results. In the first three columns of the table we exclude the trend variable. The last two columns, on the other hand, show
the results of FGLS and FE estimations of specifications including the time trend. The reason behind this estimation is to verify whether inequality
may follow some common historical trend, rather than be influenced by technological change. The insignificance of the time trend suggests that
the recent developments in income inequality are indeed driven by factors considered in our estimation framework.Table A1
Estimation results at the mean of the income inequality distribution.Pooled OLS FGLS FE FGLS FEch −0.066⁎⁎⁎ −0.068⁎⁎⁎ −0.043 −0.068⁎⁎⁎ −0.043
(0.020) (0.024) (0.041) (0.024) (0.041)en −0.054⁎⁎⁎ −0.056⁎⁎⁎ −0.035 −0.056⁎⁎⁎ −0.035
(0.010) (0.012) (0.023) (0.010) (0.023)DPcap −0.217⁎⁎⁎ −0.193⁎⁎⁎ −0.076 −0.193⁎⁎⁎ −0.076
(0.043) (0.043) (0.143) (0.043) (0.143)v −0.390⁎⁎⁎ −0.323⁎⁎⁎ −0.074 −0.323⁎⁎⁎ −0.074
(0.053) (0.059) (0.070) (0.059) (0.070)bshare 0.180⁎⁎ 0.138⁎ 0.105 0.138⁎ 0.105
(0.075) (0.071) (0.099) (0.071) (0.099)uman −0.006 −0.023 −0.032 −0.023 −0.032
(0.064) (0.065) (0.085) (0.065) (0.085)
0.760⁎⁎ 0.498 −0.196 0.498 −0.196
(0.335) (0.315) (0.340) (0.315) (0.340)me trend – – – 0.710 0.792
(0.600) (0.685). obs. 100 100 100 100 100
-squared 0.643 0.484 0.478
ald p-value 0.000 0.000WNote: Dependent variable is Gini index. For a definition of the explanatory variables, see note to Tables 2 and 4. All variables are 4-year averaged over the time span 1996–2011. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎ and ⁎
indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. For the pooled OLS and FE regressions, robust standard errors are in parenthesis. In the FGLS estimations, we allow for country-
specific serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in residuals.
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Figure B1 shows simple scatter plots of themain explanatory variable,measuring the rate of technological change, of the labour share over income (x-
axis) and themean income inequality (y-axis) in our sample. Both plots suggest the right sign of the influence as explained in our theoretical discus-
sion:whereas the rate of technological change diminishes income inequality, the skill-biased direction seems to worsen income distribution. The re-
lationship seems thus to work at the unconditional mean, as also confirmed in the results of estimations in Table B1 below. Nevertheless, what the
precise impact of technological change on income inequality along the conditional distribution looks like should be clarified in an empirical exercise.20
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Fig. B1. Unconditional relationship between the rate of technological change (x-axis, upper plots), the labour share over income (x-axis, lower plots) and income inequality (y-axes).Table B1
Results from quantile regressions of influence of technological change on income inequality based on baseline specification, but excluding other control variables.Te
N
G
Te
oDependent variable: Gini coefficientQ10 Q20 Q30 Q40 Q50 Q60 Q70 Q80 Q90ch −0.057⁎ −0.074⁎ −0.094⁎⁎ −0.078⁎⁎ −0.130⁎⁎⁎ −0.120⁎⁎ −0.129⁎⁎⁎ −0.061⁎⁎⁎ −0.038⁎⁎(0.030) (0.041) (0.031) (0.022) (0.030) (0.037) (0.051) (0.085) (0.113)
. obs. 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139
seudo R-sq. 0.046 0.020 0.039 0.067 0.075 0.072 0.053 0.016 0.011PNote: Dependent variable is the Gini index. The variables are 4-year averaged over the time span 1996–2011. ⁎⁎⁎, ⁎⁎ and ⁎ indicate significance level at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Bootstrapped standard errors are in parenthesis.
Appendix CTable C1
Descriptive statistics.Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.ini Overall 31.0 6.7 21.5 60.3 N = 139.0
Between 6.5 23.2 57.9 n = 38.0
Within 1.5 27.4 36.5 T-bar = 3.7ch Overall 24.8 24.9 1.0 148.0 N = 155.0
Between 23.0 2.8 107.5 n = 39.0
Within 9.9 −31.2 89.8 T-bar = 4.0pen Overall 88.1 49.7 20.8 314.7 N = 156.0
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go
la
h
FIMean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs.Between 48.4 25.1 278.3 n = 39.0
Within 13.1 40.4 136.3 T = 4.0DPcap Overall 23.5 13.2 1.3 79.7 N = 155.0
Between 12.4 2.1 64.3 n = 39.0
Within 4.8 4.9 38.8 T-bar = 4.0v Overall 42.2 7.8 14.3 57.5 N = 149.0
Between 7.3 18.3 55.0 n = 39.0
Within 2.5 36.4 54.6 T-bar = 3.8bshare Overall 55.6 6.1 32.9 69.5 N = 140.0
Between 5.8 40.1 68.5 n = 35.0
Within 2.0 48.5 63.4 T = 4.0uman Overall 13.2 5.7 1.6 30.7 N = 126.0
Between 5.2 3.1 23.4 n = 33.0
Within 2.6 5.2 21.2 T-bar = 3.8
Overall 1.5 1.4 −1.5 2.5 N = 152.0
Between 1.2 −1.1 2.5 n = 38.0
Within 0.7 −0.3 3.6 T = 4.0Note: For a definition of the explanatory variables, see note to Table 2.References
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